Socrates: And what other, Critias, can we find that will be better
than this, which is natural and suitable to the festival of the goddess,
and has the very great advantage of being a fact and not a fiction? How
or where shall we find another if we abandon this? We cannot, and therefore
you must tell the tale, and good luck to you; and I in return for my yesterday's
discourse will now rest and be a listener.
Critias: Let me proceed to explain to you, Socrates, the order
in which we have arranged our entertainment. Our intention is, that Timaeus,
who is the most of an astronomer amongst us, and has made the nature of
the universe his special study, should speak first, beginning with the
generation of the world and going down to the creation of man; next, I
am to receive the men whom he has created of whom some will have profited
by the excellent education which you have given them; and then, in accordance
with the tale of Solon, and equally with his law, we will bring them into
court and make them citizens, as if they were those very Athenians whom
the sacred Egyptian record has recovered from oblivion, and thenceforward
we will speak of them as Athenians and fellow-citizens.
Socrates: I see that I shall receive in my turn a perfect and
splendid feast of reason. And now, Timaeus, you, I suppose, should speak
next, after duly calling upon the Gods.
Timaeus: All men, Socrates, who have any degree of right feeling,
at the beginning of every enterprise, whether small or great, always call
upon God. And we, too, who are going to discourse of the nature of the
universe, how created or how existing without creation, if we be not altogether
out of our wits, must invoke the aid of Gods and Goddesses and pray that
our words may be acceptable to them and consistent with themselves. Let
this, then, be our invocation of the Gods, to which I add an exhortation
of myself to speak in such manner as will be most intelligible to you,
and will most accord with my own intent. First then, in my judgment, we
must make a distinction and ask, What is that which always is and has no
becoming; and what is that which is always becoming and never is?
That which is apprehended by intelligence and reason is always in the
same state; but that which is conceived by opinion with the help of sensation
and without reason, is always in a process of becoming and perishing and
never really is. Now everything that becomes or is created must of necessity
be created by some cause, for without a cause nothing can be created. The
work of the creator, whenever he looks to the unchangeable and fashions
the form and nature of his work after an unchangeable pattern, must necessarily
be made fair and perfect; but when he looks to the created only, and uses
a created pattern, it is not fair or perfect.
Was the heaven then or the world, whether called by this or by any other
more appropriate name-assuming the name, I am asking a question which has
to be asked at the beginning of an enquiry about anything-was the world,
I say, always in existence and without beginning? or created, and had it
a beginning? Created, I reply, being visible and tangible and having a
body, and therefore sensible; and all sensible things are apprehended by
opinion and sense and are in a process of creation and created. Now that
which is created must, as we affirm, of necessity be created by a cause.
But the father and maker of all this universe is past finding out; and
even if we found him, to tell of him to all men would be impossible. And
there is still a question to be asked about him: Which of the patterns
had the artificer in view when he made the world-the pattern of the unchangeable,
or of that which is created? If the world be indeed fair and the artificer
good, it is manifest that he must have looked to that which is eternal;
but if what cannot be said without blasphemy is true, then to the created
pattern. Every one will see that he must have looked to, the eternal; for
the world is the fairest of creations and he is the best of causes. And
having been created in this way, the world has been framed in the likeness
of that which is apprehended by reason and mind and is unchangeable, and
must therefore of necessity, if this is admitted, be a copy of something.
Now it is all-important that the beginning of everything should be according
to nature. And in speaking of the copy and the original we may assume that
words are akin to the matter which they describe; when they relate to the
lasting and permanent and intelligible, they ought to be lasting and unalterable,
and, as far as their nature allows, irrefutable and immovable-nothing less.
But when they express only the copy or likeness and not the eternal things
themselves, they need only be likely and analogous to the real words. As
being is to becoming, so is truth to belief. If then, Socrates, amid the
many opinions about the gods and the generation of the universe, we are
not able to give notions which are altogether and in every respect exact
and consistent with one another, do not be surprised. Enough, if we adduce
probabilities as likely as any others; for we must remember that I who
am the speaker, and you who are the judges, are only mortal men, and we
ought to accept the tale which is probable and enquire no further.
Socrates: Excellent, Timaeus; and we will do precisely as you
bid us. The prelude is charming, and is already accepted by us-may we beg
of you to proceed to the strain?
Timaeus: Let me tell you then why the creator made this world
of generation. He was good, and the good can never have any jealousy of
anything. And being free from jealousy, he desired that all things should
be as like himself as they could be. This is in the truest sense the origin
of creation and of the world, as we shall do well in believing on the testimony
of wise men: God desired that all things should be good and nothing bad,
so far as this was attainable. Wherefore also finding the whole visible
sphere not at rest, but moving in an irregular and disorderly fashion,
out of disorder he brought order, considering that this was in every way
better than the other. Now the deeds of the best could never be or have
been other than the fairest; and the creator, reflecting on the things
which are by nature visible, found that no unintelligent creature taken
as a whole was fairer than the intelligent taken as a whole; and that intelligence
could not be present in anything which was devoid of soul. For which reason,
when he was framing the universe, he put intelligence in soul, and soul
in body, that he might be the creator of a work which was by nature fairest
and best. Wherefore, using the language of probability, we may say that
the world became a living creature truly endowed with soul and intelligence
by the providence of God. This being supposed, let us proceed to the next
stage: In the likeness of what animal did the Creator make the world?
It would be an unworthy thing to liken it to any nature which exists
as a part only; for nothing can be beautiful which is like any imperfect
thing; but let us suppose the world to be the very image of that whole
of which all other animals both individually and in their tribes are portions.
For the original of the universe contains in itself all intelligible beings,
just as this world comprehends us and all other visible creatures. For
the Deity, intending to make this world like the fairest and most perfect
of intelligible beings, framed one visible animal comprehending within
itself all other animals of a kindred nature. Are we right in saying that
there is one world, or that they are many and infinite? There must be one
only, if the created copy is to accord with the original. For that which
includes all other intelligible creatures cannot have a second or companion;
in that case there would be need of another living being which would include
both, and of which they would be parts, and the likeness would be more
truly said to resemble not them, but that other which included them. In
order then that the world might be solitary, like the perfect animal, the
creator made not two worlds or an infinite number of them; but there is
and ever will be one only-begotten and created heaven.
Now that which is created is of necessity corporeal, and also visible
and tangible. And nothing is visible where there is no fire, or tangible
which has no solidity, and nothing is solid without earth. Wherefore also
God in the beginning of creation made the body of the universe to consist
of fire and earth. But two things cannot be rightly put together without
a third; there must be some bond of union between them. And the fairest
bond is that which makes the most complete fusion of itself and the things
which it combines; and proportion is best adapted to effect such a union.
For whenever in any three numbers, whether cube or square, there is a mean,
which is to the last term what the first term is to it; and again, when
the mean is to the first term as the last term is to the mean-then the
mean becoming first and last, and the first and last both becoming means,
they will all of them of necessity come to be the same, and having become
the same with one another will be all one. If the universal frame had been
created a surface only and having no depth, a single mean would have sufficed
to bind together itself and the other terms; but now, as the world must
be solid, and solid bodies are always compacted not by one mean but by
two, God placed water and air in the mean between fire and earth, and made
them to have the same proportion so far as was possible (as fire is to
air so is air to water, and as air is to water so is water to earth); and
thus he bound and put together a visible and tangible heaven. And for these
reasons, and out of such elements which are in number four, the body of
the world was created, and it was harmonised by proportion, and therefore
has the spirit of friendship; and having been reconciled to itself, it
was indissoluble by the hand of any other than the framer.
Now the creation took up the whole of each of the four elements; for
the Creator compounded the world out of all the fire and all the water
and all the air and all the earth, leaving no part of any of them nor any
power of them outside. His intention was, in the first place, that the
animal should be as far as possible a perfect whole and of perfect parts:
secondly, that it should be one, leaving no remnants out of which another
such world might be created: and also that it should be free from old age
and unaffected by disease. Considering that if heat and cold and other
powerful forces which unite bodies surround and attack them from without
when they are unprepared, they decompose them, and by bringing diseases
and old age upon them, make them waste away-for this cause and on these
grounds he made the world one whole, having every part entire, and being
therefore perfect and not liable to old age and disease. And he gave to
the world the figure which was suitable and also natural.
Now to the animal which was to comprehend all animals, that figure was
suitable which comprehends within itself all other figures. Wherefore he
made the world in the form of a globe, round as from a lathe, having its
extremes in every direction equidistant from the centre, the most perfect
and the most like itself of all figures; for he considered that the like
is infinitely fairer than the unlike. This he finished off, making the
surface smooth all around for many reasons; in the first place, because
the living being had no need of eyes when there was nothing remaining outside
him to be seen; nor of ears when there was nothing to be heard; and there
was no surrounding atmosphere to be breathed; nor would there have been
any use of organs by the help of which he might receive his food or get
rid of what he had already digested, since there was nothing which went
from him or came into him: for there was nothing beside him. Of design
he was created thus, his own waste providing his own food, and all that
he did or suffered taking place in and by himself. For the Creator conceived
that a being which was self-sufficient would be far more excellent than
one which lacked anything; and, as he had no need to take anything or defend
himself against any one, the Creator did not think it necessary to bestow
upon him hands: nor had he any need of feet, nor of the whole apparatus
of walking; but the movement suited to his spherical form was assigned
to him, being of all the seven that which is most appropriate to mind and
intelligence; and he was made to move in the same manner and on the same
spot, within his own limits revolving in a circle. All the other six motions
were taken away from him, and he was made not to partake of their deviations.
And as this circular movement required no feet, the universe was created
without legs and without feet.
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